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Labor Law
by Mack A. Player*
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey of 1983 labor law cases from the Eleventh Circuit concen-
trates on labor relations law, but includes cases arising under statutes
regulating work place standards, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).2 The area
of labor law that discusses employment discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, national origin, religion, age, and handicap is covered in another
survey article."
This is a survey, and as the word suggests, it will not provide an ex-
haustive, in depth, or critical discussion of the law. I have attempted,
however, to provide sufficient background to place the cases under survey
in a context so that their significance can be recognized.
Not every labor law case from the Eleventh Circuit has been noted
herein. I have eliminated all nonopinion cases and certain cases with
opinions that did not raise significant issues.
II. FAIR LAJsoR STANDARDS Act
A. Coverage
The FLSA4 requires that employers pay covered employees statutory
minimum wages,' provide equal pay to men and women who perform
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. Drury College (A.B., 1963); University of Mis-
souri (J.D., 1965); George Washington University (LIS.M., 1972). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Id. § 651-678.
3. Clineberg & Schneider, Employment Discrimination, 1983 Eleventh Circuit Survey,
35 MERcER L Ray. 1169 (1984).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
5. Id. § 206.
1251
HeinOnline  -- 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1251 1983-1984
MERCER LAW REVIEW
equal work,6 and give premium pay to employees who work in excess of
forty hours per week.7 Coverage under the FSLA can be established in
two ways. The first is based on the employee's contact with interstate
commerce. An employee "engaged in commerce"s or in the "production of
goods for commerce"' will be covered regardless of the size of the em-
ployer or number of employees. In addition to individual coverage, all
employees of an employer will be covered if the employer is a defined
"enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce."'
1
In Johnston v. Spacefone Corp.," the court addressed the issue of
whether an individual employee was engaged in the 'production of goods
for commerce.' The employee was a designer/draftsman who worked on
the planning and testing of a prototype cordless telephone." The proto-
type phone had been transported interstate in an attempt to solicit inves-
tors for the project. s The employer argued that work on a prototype was
not 'production',"1 that since it was only a single object the statutory re-
quirement of a plural 'goods' was not satisfied,"5 and that since ultimate
production and interstate'marketing of the phones was in the future and
might never take place, the employee's 'production' could not now be said
to be 'commerce'.'s The trial court agreed with defendant and dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.17 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the employee had engaged in the 'production of goods for
commerce.'" The court reasoned, first, that 'production' is broadly de-
fined by the statute not only to include working on the final products
actually destined for commerce, but also to include any "closely related
process or occupation directly essential to the production.'" The court
6. Id. § 206(d).
7. Id. § 207.
8. Id. § 206(a).
9. Id. "Produced" is defined at 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1976), "goods" at 29 U.S.C. § 203(i)
(1976), and "commerce" at 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. I 206(a) (1976). "Enterprise" is defined at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1976) and
"enterprise engaged in commerce" at 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (Supp. V 1981). For a general dis-
cussion of coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act see M. Player, Enterprise Coverage of
the Fair Labor Standards Act: An.Assessment of the First Generation, 28 VAN. L. Rav.
283 (1975).
11. 706 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir. 1983).
12. Id. at 1180.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1181.
15. Id. at 1183 n.6.
16. Id. at 1181.
17. Id. at 1180.
18. Id. at 1183.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1976). The court relied heavily on Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S.
1252 [Vol. 35
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concluded that design and testing were closely related to ultimate produc-
tion and thus met the statutory definition.'0 Secondly, the court believed
that a 'production' would be for 'commerce' even if the final production
had reached an interstate market. 1 If, at the time of the employee's
work, the employer reasonably expected its product to move or cause
movement in interstate commerce, the production would be 'for' com-
merce." The court also noted that the prototype phone itself was circu-
lated in interstate commerce.2 Finally, the court believed the employee
was working on 'goods' (plural) even though he was working on a single
object." The court declined to interpret the statute literally to exclude
work on a single object."s Even accepting, arguendo, defendant's narrow
definition, the court held that, because the employee had handled and
trimmed plastic and utilized plans, the employee literally had produced
'goods. '" Thus, the employee was engaged in production (preliminarily
working on the planning and construction of a phone) of 'goods' (the
phone itself and its component parts) 'for commerce' (a necessary step in
the intended marketing of the product).'
In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA to make it applicable to employ-
ers of state and local governments ." In 1976, the Supreme Court in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery" declared that, as applied to certain em-
ployees of state and local governments, the statute was an
unconstitutional infringement of state sovereignty, which had been pre-
served by the tenth amendment30 In Alewine v. City Council of Au-
gusta, 1 the Eleventh Circuit addressed the significant issue of whether
the Supreme Court's analysis in National League of Cities' was applica-
ble to an urban mass transit service operated by the city. The Court of
Appeals drew a distinction between traditional governmental and nongov-
ernmental functions and held that the FLSA was unconstitutional only as
679 (1945) in which the Supreme Court held that maintenance employees who worked in an
office building staffed by executive employees were engaged in the "production of goods"
because they were performing a function "necessary" to the ultimate production of prod-
ucts. Id. at 683.
20. 706 F.2d at 1181.
21. Id. at 1182.
22. Id. (quoting Wirtz v. Ray Smith Transport Co., 409 F.2d 954, 957 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 986 (1969)).
23. 706 F.2d at 1183.
24. Id. at 1183 n.6.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1182.
27. Id. at 1183.
28. 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified as 29 U.S.C. I 203(d) (1976)).
29. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
30. Id. at 852.
31. 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983).
1984] 1253
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applied to "traditional governmental functions."' The court concluded
that Congress constitutionally could, and did, require state governments
to pay minimum wages and overtime to employees who perform nongov-
ernmental functions3a The court then concluded that mass transit ser-
vices are not traditional governmental activities." The Eleventh Circuit
relied primarily upon the recent Supreme Court decision of United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad.U In that case, the Su-
preme Court held that a state-operated railroad primarily engaged in
commuter transportation was constitutionally subject to the Railway La-
bor Act (RLA), distinguishing National League of Cities because it ad-
dressed 'traditional' acts of the sovereign.8 7 In light of Long Island Rail-
road, the Supreme Court in Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,15 vacated and remanded a trial court decision con-
cluding that the FLSA could not be constitutionally applied to a munici-
pal transit system.8' The Eleventh Circuit deemed those two cases to con-
trol the issue before it.so Thus, the FLSA is applicable to all employees of
state and local governments who perform nongovernmental functions,
and public transit employees are deemed to be performing a nongovern-
mental function. The difficult task of identifying nongovernmental, as op-
posed to 'traditional,' functions in other contexts will have to be ad-
dressed by the courts."
B. Wages
Since 1981, employers have been required to pay covered employees the
32. Id. at 1066-70.
33. Id. at 1070.
34. Id. at 1069. The Equal Pay Amendment to the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)) is
constitutional as applied to all public employees, including those performing traditional
governmental functions. See Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1979).
Congress has the power either under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment or under its art. I, § 8
commerce power to regulate sex discrimination by state and local governments. See EEOC
v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
35. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
36. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
37. 455 U.S. at 686.
38. 457 U.S. 1102 (1982), prob. juris, noted, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983).
39. Id.
40. 699 F.2d at 1067-68. Accord Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 786 (1983).
41. For example, such a distinction has long been recognized in the area of municipal
tort liability, but the identification of nongovernmental functions has proved difficult. See
generally R. Sswrm±, Thu LAw o, Mumczrn Towr Lseu" GzoRoL (3d ed. 1980), 1-
40. To illustrate, it might be argued that post-secondary education is not a 'traditional'
governmental function. See, eg., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). Consequently,
employees of state universities might be covered by the FLSA.
• 1254 [Vol. 35
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minimum wage of $3.35 per hour.42 The FLSA, however, permits an em-
ployer to credit "the reasonable cost. .. to the employer of furnishing
such employee with board ... if such board ... [is] customarily fur-
nished ... to his employees."4 8 The Secretary of Labor, who interprets
and enforces the FLSA, would allow an employer to set off the cost of
meals furnished to employees only if the election to take meals instead of
cash was voluntary. A mandatory requirement that employees must take
meals would prohibit the employer from using the cost of the meals in
calculating the minimum wage rate." In two identical cases, Morrison
Inc. v. Donovan4" and Davis Bros. v. Donovan,"4 a divided panel of the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the Secretary's interpretation of the statute. In
both cases, the employer was a large restaurant chain serving food cafete-
ria style. Employees were paid less than the minimum wage in cash. To
reach the required minimum wage, the employer added the fair cost of
providing meals to employees. The employees had no option to receive
money in lieu of meals; participation in the 'meal plan' was a condition of
employment.' 7
The court first looked to the literal language of the FSLA and found no
basis to construe a requirement that furnished food must be 'voluntary.'
The only qualification was that the food must be 'customarily furnished.'
The court held 'customarily' cannot be construed, as the Secretary had
done, to include 'voluntary.' The court could not find a legislative intent
to support the Secretary's interpretation that Congress desired to exclude
mandatory meal plans because they would lead to further oppression of
the low wage employees.4
Judge Clark dissented in both cases.' Although he agreed with the ma-
jority's rejection of a requirement of voluntariness, Judge Clark pointed
out that both Morrison and Davis Brothers had only recently adopted the
practice of deducting the cost of employees' meals." Thus, Judge Clark
argued, the practice could not be deemed to be 'customary,' as required
by the express statutory language." Morrison's and Davis Brothers' cafe-
terias, therefore, were permitted to pay their employees the handsome
wage of $3.00 per hour cash and impose a credit of 35 cents per hour as a
reasonable cost of providing their meals.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
43. Id. § 203(m) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
44. See 29 C.F.R. 9 531.30 (1981).
45. 700 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir. 1983).
46. 700 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1983).
47. 700 F.2d at 1369-70; 700 F.2d at 1375.
48. 700 F.2d at 1371; 700 F.2d at 1376.
49. 700 F.2d at 1372 (Clark, J., dissenting); 700 F.2d at 1376 (Clark, J., dissenting).
50. 700 F.2d at 1372; 700 F.2d at 1377.
51. 700 F.2d at 1372-73; 700 F.2d at 1377.
19841 1255
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III. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT
A. The Election Campaign
Pre-election Unfair Labor Practices. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.," the Supreme Court held that when a union establishes its majority
status at a point prior to the election and the employer commits unfair
labor practices that tend to preclude the holding of a fair election, the
NLRB (Board) is empowered, as a remedy for the unfair practices, to
order the employer to bargain with the union." In Piggly Wiggly, Tusca-
loosa Division Commodores Point Terminal Corp. v. NLRB," the Elev-
enth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's Gissel doctrine. Soon after the
union had established its majority status and demanded recognition, the
employer committed serious unfair labor practices, the worst of which oc-
curred when management officials interrupted a union meeting by record-
ing employee attendance at the meeting and interrogating employees on
their reasons for attending the meeting." The employer did not contest
the Board finding that these actions constituted unfair labor practices,
nor did it vigorously contest the general seriousness of the violations."
Instead, the employer argued that the lapse of more than two months
between the violations and the election, which the union lost by a ninety-
nine to sixty vote, made it inappropriate for the Board to issue a Gissel
bargaining order. 7 The court engaged in -a very limited review of the
Board remedy, concluding that it should only be disturbed if it "can be
shown that the [Bloard either abused its discretion or exceeded its statu-
tory authority."" The court concluded that neither the lapse of time be-
tween the unfair labor practices and the election, nor the one-third
workforce turnover during this period warranted, as a matter of law, re-
fusal to enforce the bargaining order remedy. " The court observed that
"[p]ractices may live on in the lore of the shop and continue to repress
employee sentiment long after most, or even all, original participants
have departed.""
Threats and Promises Not Amounting to Unfair Labor Prac-
52. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
53. Id. at 610-16.
54. 705 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 1540.
56. Id. at 1541.
57. Id. at 1543.
58. Id. at 1542 (quoting NLRB v. Kaiser Agricultural Chems., 473 F.2d 374,382 (5th Cir.
1973)).
59. 705 F.2d at 1542-43.
60. Id. at 1543 (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 1978)).
1256 [Vol. 35
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tices. In Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB e1 the court listed the requirements
that are necessary to set aside an election based on union threats:
(1) whether the evidence established fear in the minds of the voters; (2)
whether that fear affected their votes; and (3) whether, had it not been
for the fear, the results of the election might have been different ....
The objecting party must prove by specific evidence that the election
results did not reflect the unimpeded choice of the employees."
The court held that an isolated statement by a union adherent that he
would "shoot" two employees if they voted against the union did not sat-
isfy this standard.es Thus, the Board's refusal to conduct a post election
hearing on the issue was not error."
In TRW-United Greenfield Division v. NLRB, the court set forth the
scope of judicial review for Board decisions that refused to set aside elec-
tions based on allegations of coercive speech. The court stated:
The Board has broad discretion in conducting and supervising elections.
Determination of whether a union representation election was unfairly
conducted and should be set aside is primarily a question for the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. The burden is on the objecting party to
prove, by specific evidence, not only that unlawful acts occurred but also
that those acts interfered with the employees' exercise of free choice to
such an extent that they materially affected the results of the election.
Thus, the only question for this court is whether the Board reasonably
exercised its discretion in overruling the company's election objections
and ballot challenges. The Board's determination will be sustained if it is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole."
Misrepresentations. In Certainteed, the court confirmed the latest
Board vacillation in its policy concerning misrepresentations in pre-elec-
tion propaganda. In the 1960's, the Board stated the Hollywood Ceramics
rule: "[A]n election should be set aside only where there has been a mis-
representation ...at a time which prevents the other party . . . from
making an effective reply so that the misrepresentation... may reasona-
bly be expected to have a significant impact on the election.'"' For a
61. 714 F.2d 1042 (11th Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 1060 (citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 716 F.2d 1391 (11th Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 1393 (citations omitted). At an employee meeting, the question was asked
whether a person would be able to work if the union won the election and called a strike. A
union representative responded that he did not think it would be advisable. This was not
construed by the Board to be a threat that would preclude employee free choice. The court
held that the evidence fell far short of requiring a reversal of that finding. Id. at 1394.
67. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962).
12571984]
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short period in the mid-1970's, the Board abandoned this approach in
favor of setting aside certification elections for untrue statements only if
the party utilized forged documents. The Board would not refuse to rec-
ognize the results solely on the basis that a party had made false and
misleading statements.s In 1978, the Board abandoned this Shopping
Kart experiment in abstention, readopting the Hollywood Ceramics prac-
tice of policing pre-election propaganda to determine if false statements
might reasonably have impacted on the election results." In 1982, the
Board, in Midland National Life Insurance Co.,70 abandoned the
Hollywood Ceramics practice and returned again, at least for the time
being, to the Shopping Kart rule of abstention.7' An election, therefore,
will be set aside for false statements by one of the parties only when the
party utilizes a forged document that would "render the voters unable to
recognize propaganda for what it is,'7' and when official NLRB docu-
ments are altered to make it appear that the Board has endorsed a party
to the election.7 According to the Board in Midland National Life, non-
coercive propaganda will not be used by the Board as the basis for setting
aside an election simply because the propaganda was false and might
have had an effect on the election outcome.'
In Certainteed, the employer alleged that a union had made factual
misstatements immediately prior to a certification election that could
have had a significant impact on the election.7 At the time the employer
filed objections to the election, the Hollywood Ceramics rule was in ef-
fect.' Nonetheless, the Board dismissed the employer's objections with-
68. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1311 (1977).
69. General Knit of California, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 620 (1978).
70. 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
71. Id. at 129.
72. Id. at 133.
73. Id. The Eleventh Circuit addressed this misrepresentation of the Board's position
'exception' concerning nonintervention in the case of NLRB v. Omni Georgia, 707 F.2d 453
(11th Cir. 1983). Four days prior to an election, the union had distributed a leaflet stating
that the employer had fired several employees and that the employer was forced by the
federal government to reinstate the employees with back wages. In fact, the two employees
were reinstated prior to any action by the NLRB and the employees received back pay
pursuant to a settlement agreement that contained a 'nonadmission' of guilt clause. The
Board found that any misrepresentation of the process was not substantial enough to war-
rant setting aside the election. The court agreed, finding that "the Board has discretion in
determining whether its good offices were abused by use or implication of its name or au-
thority in the leaflet." Id. at 456.
74. 263 N.L.RB. at 133. The rule relating to misrepresentation is not a relaxation of
scrutiny given to statements of threats or promises. They will still be analyzed to determine
their impact upon an election. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 60-65.
75. 714 F.2d at 1046.
76. Id.
1258 [Vol. 35'
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out a hearing.77 The employer refused to bargain, contesting the validity
of the certification in light of Hollywood Ceramics and the Board's re-
fusal to conduct a hearing on the issues raised thereunder.7 While review
was pending of the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(5) unlawful refusal to
bargain,7 9 the Board abandoned the Hollywood Ceramics rule and
adopted the Shopping Kart rule that it would not set aside elections on
the basis of simple pre-election misrepresentations."
The employer's primary challenge to the Board's order was that, as a
matter of law, the Board must follow the Hollywood Ceramics rule of
reviewing pre-election propaganda for its accuracy and potential impact
on elections." Second, the employer argued that because the court had
previously enforced orders of the Board that applied Hollywood Ceram-
ics, it should continue to follow its own precedent rather than vacillate
with each change of Board position.2
The court rejected both arguments.8 It agreed that if the Hollywood
Ceramics rule was applicable, the employer raised sufficient factual issues
to require the Board to conduct a hearing before dismissing the em-
ployer's challenge." The court, however, concluded that it would follow
the Board's latest policy on the treatment of pre-election propaganda. 5
Although admitting the Board could not make wholly arbitrary decisions,
the court, nonetheless, recognized that in establishing policies and proce-
dures to insure the integrity of the election process, Congress had given
the Board broad discretion to experiment and use its expertise." Not-
withstanding the argument that constant vacillation indicated the arbi-
trary nature of the Board's decision, the court found that this recent
change was within the broad range of the Board's discretion.87 The court
further recognized that the Board practice could not violate statutory pol-
icy." Although 'laboratory conditions' at the time of elections is a valid
policy to pursue, other policies, including free speech and administrative
77. Id. at 1047.
78. Id. at 1046.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
80. 714 F.2d at 1046-47.
81. Id. at 1052-55.
82. Id. at 1054-55.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1052. Accord NLRB v. Knickerbocker Food, Inc., 715 F.2d 509, 511 (11th Cir.
1983); NLRB v. Claxton Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 1364, 1365, modified, 618 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1980).
85. 714 F.2d at 1055.
86. Id. at 1052.
87. Id. at 1053.
88. Id. at 1052.
19841 1259
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efficiency, can be properly weighed by the Board.89 This is particularly
true in light of the empirical evidence that pre-election propaganda had
very little impact on election results." The court concluded that the
Shopping Kart rule of abstention did not violate statutory policy.'1 Thus,
as a matter of law, the new Board rule need not be rejected." The court
also determined that it should not follow the prior precedent that sanc-
tioned Board evaluation of propaganda." The court reasoned that, al-
though Board standards may evolve, the scope of judicial review should
be limited to determining whether the evolution is arbitrary or violates
statutory policy." Judicial review approving a given Board policy, there-
fore, should not freeze that policy against further change by the Board."5
In adopting the rule of abstention in Midland National Life, the Board
indicated that it would be applied to pending Board cases, but the Board
did not make it clear whether the new practice was to retroactively affect
cases resolved by the Board but pending in court." The court concluded
that an administrative hearing should have been granted by the Board on
the employer's objections if the Board was applying the Hollywood Ce-
ramics rule." No Board hearing, however, would be necessary if the Mid-
land National Life rule of abstention was to be applied." The court re-
manded the case to the Board to determine if the rule in Midland
National Life should be given retroactive effect to cases pending before
the judiciary, and if not, to grant a hearing on the employer's Hollywood
Ceramics objections to the election."
Voter Eligibility: The Definition of "Employee." Only "employ-
ees" are entitled to vote in certification elections.'°° The Act specifically
exempts "independent contractors" from the definition of employee'
but fails to define the term. Congress made it clear, however, that enforc-
ing agencies should apply traditional principles of agency law.' °0 Applying
89. See generally Grum& , GoLDmT & Hm , UMON RumsENTATioN ELEC-
TiONs: LAW AND RzALTY (1976).
90. Id.
91. 714 F.2d at 1054.
92. Id. at 1055.
93. Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.
1962); NLRB v. Trinity Steel Co., 214 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1954).
94. 714 F.2d at 1052.
95. See id. at 1055.
96. 263 N.L.R.B. at 132.
97. 714 F.2d at 1052.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1064.
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); Trailmobile Division, Pullman, Inc. v. NLRB, 379
F.2d 419, 423 (5th Cir. 1967).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
102. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
[Vol. 351260
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those principles, the courts have concentrated on the degree of control or
supervision by the putative employer over the agent and the level of en-
trepreneurial interest of the agent. Neither one nor both of these ele-
ments are conclusive. Generally, the greater the 'right of control' of the
principal, the more likely it appears that an employment relationship ex-
ists; the greater the level of entrepreneurial interest of the agent the more
likely it appears that the agent is an independent contractor.1 03 The Elev-
enth Circuit applied this test in NLRB v. Associated Diamond Cabs,
Inc..10 Taxi drivers, who were "daily lessees," paid to the company a flat
rental fee for the use of a company-owned cab. 105 The driver also paid a
mileage rate based on the actual mileage the cab was driven.'" The driver
was entitled to retain, without any accounting, all of the fares that he or
she collected.10 The 'right of control' over the drivers was limited largely
to a requirement that the drivers keep themselves neat and clean and
that they conduct themselves in a courteous manner.108 They were not
required to respond to dispatch calls. 1" The company would, however,
refuse to lease cabs to any driver who had more than three accidents per
year if he or she was at fault.110 The drivers could drive as few or as many
hours within the twelve hour shift as they desired and could lease the cab
from the company for up to two consecutive shifts.' Drivers were re-
quired to complete "trip sheets" on all fares, but this obligation was im-
posed by the municipal licensing authority, not by the company.'" From
this factual basis, the court concluded that the company was exercising
insufficient control over the activity of the driver to support a Board find-
ing of 'employment.' 1I Further, it appeared that the driver had substan-
tial entrepreneurial interests.1"' He was not being provided the tools
owned by his employer free of charge nor was he provided these tools to
create wealth for the employer.1 ' Rather the driver was leasing the tools,
1st Sess. 18 (1947).
103. Local 777, Seafarers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 872-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
SIDA of Hawaii, Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502
F.2d 1221, 1223-24 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1047 (1975); Frito-Lay, Inc. v.
NLRB, 385 F.2d 180, 187 (7th Cir. 1967).
104. 702 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1983).
105. Id. at 916.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 916-18.
108. Id. at 924.
109. Id. at 918.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 921.
112. Id. at 922.
113. Id. at 920.
114. Id. at 921.
115. Id.
19841 1261
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in this case the cab, to provide wealth for himself."'
In addition to independent contractors, the Act also excludes supervi-
sors from its definition of 'employees' eligible to vote."1 The Act, how-
ever, does define "supervisors. ' "s In TRW-United Greenfield Div. v.
NLRB,"O employees dispatched work through a manufacturing sequence
to other employees by following instructions from the company industrial
engineering department.'" The employer argued that, since the dispatch-
ers were assigning work and could recommend disciplinary action for poor
results, the dispatchers were 'supervisors' within the statutory defini-
tion."' The court rejected this argument and sustained a Board finding
that the dispatchers were employees. n The court held that simple rout-
ing of work in a predetermined sequence set forth on a computer printout
did not constitute supervision."" The court further noted that the dis-
patchers' authority to recommend discipline carried no power to follow
through or influence ultimate decisions.'" Finally, the court noted that
"nearly everyone at one time or another, under some conditions, tells
someone else what to do, but that one who engages in an isolated incident
of supervision is not necessarily a supervisor under the Act."' Given the
court's limited scope of review, it was unwilling to hold that the Board's
conclusion was clearly erroneous.1s"
116. Id. Accord Local 777, Seafarers Intl Union v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 878 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual'& i4iuthority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical na-
ture, but requires the use of independent judgment.
119. 716 F.2d 1391 (11th Cir. 1983).
120. Id. at 1394-95.
121. Id. at 1395.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Accord NLRB v. Knickerbocker Food, Inc., 715 F.2d 509, 511 (11th Cir. 1983).
In this case, the NLRB found that a particular employee who performed 'leadman' responsi-
bilities was not a 'supervisor.' The court affimed the Board findings stating that they were
supported by substantial evidence. The Board also found that another employee did not
have sufficient continuity of interest with the unit to be entitled to vote. The court, utilizing
the same limited review, sustained this finding of ineligibility. Id. at 511.
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B. Employee Activity and Employer Retaliation
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)127 protects in-
dividuals who engage in "concerted activity" for their "mutual aid or pro-
tection." Section 8(a)(1) e makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the exercise of
the rights protected by section 7. By its language, the Act does not pro-
tect purely individual action; 'concerted' activity includes two or more
employees.12 The Board has taken the position that individual action to
secure enforcement of statutory protections designed to protect employ-
ees as a class, for example, occupational safety and workers' compensa-
tion, is 'concerted' activity.18 0 Furthermore, the Board has held that indi-
vidual action is 'concerted' if the individual invokes the protections of a
collective bargaining agreement. 1 The issue of whether one person as-
serting the protection of a collective agreement is protected 'concerted'
activity came before the Eleventh Circuit in Roadway Express, Inc. v.
NLRB. 10 Two employees, acting independently of each other, alleged
that they were disciplined for complaining to supervisors about unsafe
127. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
129. NLRB v. Charles H. McCauley Associates, 657 F.2d 685, 688 (5th Cir. 1981); Onta-
rio Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1980), Kohls v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 173,
177 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981). See also Enerhaul, Inc. v. NLRB, 710
F.2d 748, 751 (11th Cir. 1983) discussed infra notes 139-160.
130. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 1000-01 (1975) (discipline of an employee
who filed state occupational safety charge was violation of § 8(a)(1)); see also Self Cycle
Marine Distributor Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 75, 75-76 (1978) (filing of unemployment claim was
"concerted"). The courts, however, were unwilling to accept this broad interpretation of the
statute. See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1980). The
Board recently overruled Alleluia Cushion and will no longer find purely individual action
to enforce statutory rights to be 'concerted.' "To find an employee's activity to be 'con-
certed' we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees,
and not solely by and on behalf of the employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the
employee himself." Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1984). See also Jim Causley
Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 124 (6th Cir. 1983), in which the court enforced a Board
finding that although one employee filed a state OSHA claim, he had done so on behalf of
other employees who had a similar complaint, and thus his action was 'concerted.'
131. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966), enforced, 388 F.2d 495
(2d Cir. 1967). Accord, Roadway Express, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 278, 279 (1975), enforced, 532
F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe Mfg. Corp., 428 F.2d 217, 221 (8th Cir.
1970). This concept is known as the Interboro doctrine. The Board made it clear that its
retreat from its position that invoking statutory protections was 'concerted' was not an
abandonment of the Interboro doctrine. Meyers Industries, 268 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 1984
NLRB Jan. (CCH) 1 16,019 (1984). The Supreme Court has held the Interboro doctrine a
reasonable interpretation of the Act. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1505,
1509-15 (1984). See infra text accompanying notes 149-56.
132. 700 F.2d 687, 694 (l1th Cir. 1983).
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and inadequate equipment, a right arguably given to them under a collec-
tive agreement.133 A third employee alleged that he was disciplined for
objecting to a warning letter that was placed in his personnel file.'" The
court recognized that authorities were split on whether invoking individ-
ual rights under a collective agreement is 'concerted,' and thus protected
by section 7,1" and noted the issue was unresolved by either the Eleventh
Circuit or the predecessor Fifth Circuit.13 The court first expressed sym-
pathy with the Board's argument that because collective bargaining is
'concerted' activity, the assertion of a contract right necessarily must be
considered 'concerted.'1 37 Nonetheless, because of dicta in a prior Fifth
Circuit opinioni that was critical of the Board's position, the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the Board's argument and held that individual activity
asserting 'collective' agreement rights is not necessarily protected. 39 The
court held that "an individual's conduct may constitute protected con-
certed activity [only] if engaged in to initiate, induce, or prepare for
group action or relate to group action in the interest of other
employees. '1 "4
This limited reading of 'concerted' has since been rejected by the Su-
preme Court in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc." A collective
agreement prohibited the employer from requiring employees to operate
unsafe vehicles. An employee believed a truck was unsafe.14' The em-
133. Id. at 689-91.
134. Id. at 688-89.
135. Id. at 693. See supra note 129. Cf. NLRB v. Parr Lance Ambulance Service, 723
F.2d 575, 115 L.R.R.M. 2193 (7th Cir. 1983), in which a similar complaint about unsafe
equipment was held to have been made for himself and others, and thus was 'concerted.'
136. 700 F.2d at 693-94.
137. Id. at 694.
138. NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973). An employee
was discharged for causing dissension among coworkers after he failed to gain a more
favorable individual contract for himself. Id. at 717. He did not invoke any collective agree-
ment or assert any rights under a collective agreement, and the court so found. Id. at 719-
20. Nonetheless, the court stated, somewhat gratuitously, that the "statutory basis for the
concerted activity rule announced in Interboro is questionable and hence we decline to fol-
low that decision." Id. at 719. Clearly, the Eleventh Circuit is bound by stare decisis to
follow the holdings of the former Fifth-Circuit Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). It is not, however, so clear that the Eleventh Circuit should have
felt itself bound by this blatant dictum. The Eleventh Circuit's position was supported by
similar rejections of the Interboro doctrine in other circuits. See, e.g., Aro, Inc. v. NLRB,
596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881, 884 (3d Cir.
1971).
139. 700 F.2d at 694.
140. Id. Accord NLRB v. Datapoint Corp., 642 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1981); Mushroom
Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
141. 104 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1984).
142. Id. at 1509.
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ployee invoked no contract enforcement machinery, nor specifically re-
ferred to the collective agreement; he simply refused to drive the truck.
The NLRB held this action was 'concerted' and thus protected by section
8(a)(1).' 43 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused enforcement,144 cit-
ing a Sixth Circuit precedent that employed a similar analysis later used
in the Eleventh Circuit in Roadway Express. '4 The Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals, concluding that the Board's approach did not
constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the Act.1' e The Court stated:
[W]hen an employee invokes a right grounded in the collective-bargain-
ing agreement, he does not stand alone. Instead, he brings to bear on his
employer the power and resolve of all his fellow employees .... Fur-
thermore, the acts of joining and assisting a labor organization, which § 7
explicitly recognizes as concerted, are related to collective action in es-
sentially the same way that the invocation of a collective bargaining right
is related to collective action." '7
Responding to the argument that the employee must specifically invoke
the collective agreement to justify his action, the Court concluded: "As
long as the nature of the employee's complaint is reasonably clear to the
person to whom it is communicated, and the complaint does, in fact, refer
to a reasonably perceived violation of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, the complaining employee is engaged in the process of enforcing
that agreement. 1 48 This overruled the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in
Roadway Express.
The total absence of any protection for the individual who, outside of a
contract, complains about working conditions, including the safety of ma-
chinery, was emphasized in Enerhaul Inc. v. NLRB." In this case, a mo-
tion for expenses was filed"" under the Equal Access to Justice Act.151 An
employee was allegedly concerned about the poor maintenance of a truck
143. Id.
144. City Disposal Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.
Ct. 1505 (1984).
145. Aro, Inc. v. NLRB, 596 F.2d 713, 717 (6th Cir. 1979). See supra text accompanying
notes 132-40.
146. 104 S. Ct. at 1511.
147. Id. at 1511-12.
148. Id. at 1515.
149. 710 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1983).
150. Id. at 750.
151. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981) provides:
An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing
party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that
party in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the
agency finds that the position of the agency as a party to the proceeding was sub-
stantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
1984] 1265
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he was required to drive and brought his complaints* to the attention of
other employees and to the employer. He was discharged, according to
the employer, because it was believed that the employee was abusing the
truck and because he was "a 'complainer', unhappy with his job. 152 The
General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint on the theory that the
employee's grievances constituted "concerted activity."' 31 The Adminis-'
trative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the activity of the employee was
'concerted' but dismissed the complaint because the employee would have
been fired even in the absence of his protected 'concerted' activities. ' " No
exceptions were filed with the Board, and thus the decision became that
of the Board.'se Thereafter, the employer filed a petition under the Equal
Access to Justice Act for fees and expenses incurred in defending the
General Counsel's complaint. The ALJ issued a supplemental order that
the General Counsel's position that the employee had engaged in "con-
certed activity" was substantially justified. On the basis on this finding,
the AIJ denied the employer's petition for expenses. The Board affirmed
the ALJ's dismissal,1" and the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
1 7
The court held first that the burden rests with the government to prove
that a fee award should not be made in favor of a prevailing party." The
court found that there was no basis in law or in fact for arguing that
complaints by an individual about the safety of his equipment to fellow
workers and to his employer was 'concerted activity' within the meaning
of section 7 of the NLRA.'" Although the court recognized that it would
be inappropriate to award fees against the government if it advances "in
good faith a novel but credible extension and interpretation of the
law,"'" the court nonetheless concluded that the General Counsel's posi-
tion was "unreasonable under the law of this Circuit."''" The court thus
152. 710 F.2d at 749.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 749-50.
155. Id. at 750.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 751.
158. Id. at 750.
159. Id. at 751.
160. Id. (quoting H.R. Rzs. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NzwS 4984, 4990).
161. 710 F.2d at 751. Compare Wyandotte Savings Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119 (6th
Cir. 1982), in which the court upheld the denial of fees to the losing party, stating that "the
mere fact that the NLRB was the losing party or the fact that the NLRB's position was
contrary to prior Sixth Circuit precedent does not mean that the Board was not substan-
tially justified in seeking enforcement of its order." Id. at 120. As there was no prior law in
the Eleventh Circuit on this issue, it is hard to take seriously the court's observation that
the NLRB had relied on "a legal theory that has been clearly and repeatedly rejected by
this Court." 710 F.2d at 751. Furthermore, even if prior Fifth Circuit authority is deemed to
[Vol. 351266
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concluded that the ALJ's dismissal of the petition for fees was an abuse
of discretion."'
Employee misconduct during an economic strike was the issue
presented in Georgia Kraft Co. v. NLRB. During an economic work
stoppage, striking employees engaged in two types of conduct that re-
sulted in the employer refusing to reinstate them at the end of the strike.
One striking employee had shouted unflattering and obscene remarks at a
management employee as she crossed the picket line.1' Two other strik-
ing employees visited the home of a working employee and made state-
ments that some might consider threatening.'"
The court recognized that economic strikers retain their status as em-
ployees and, if vacancies exist, must be reinstated to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent positions upon an unconditional application to re-
turn to work.1" The employer may refuse to reinstate the employees only
by carrying the burden of demonstrating that the employee engaged in
significant misconduct.' s7 The Board's position has been that it may order
reinstatement even when the activity would be "unprotected" if engaged
in while working, if the objectionable conduct was committed during, and
as a part of, a strike, and the conduct was not sufficiently serious to war-
rant a discharge "for cause."'" In this regard, the Board will deny rein-
be controlling, the Eleventh Circuit seems much more willing than the Sixth Circuit to make
the price of legal experimentation by the Board the payment of fees incurred by the prevail-
ing party. Indeed, liability for fees may depend on the happenstance of which circuit reviews
a Board order. (See § 10(f) of the Act, which gives persons aggrieved by Board orders the
option of seeking review when the unfair labor practice was committed, when the person
aggrieved does business, or in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.) 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(f) (1976). See A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN, CAmS AND MA.tIALS ON LABOR LAW 109
(9th ed. 1981). A rule may be 'settled' in one circuit and unresolved or contrary in another.
Thus, if the respondent can win the 'race to the courthouse' and secure review in the 'set-
tled' circuit, he may be able to secure his expenses from the government, even though the
law is not so 'settled' from a Board or national perspective.
162. 710 F.2d at 751.
163. 696 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1983).
164. Id. at 935 n.3. A female industrial relations manager was, on two occasions, called
either a "bitch" or "that ugly bitch."
165. Id. at 934. Two employees "reeking of liquor" came to a nonstriking employee's
home and inquired why the employee was working and not on the picket line. Id. When the
nonstriking employee replied that he needed the money, the strikers responded, "Yeah,
well take care of you." Later in the conversation they called the nonstriking employee an
obscene name in the presence of his wife and child. Id. at 934 n.2.
166. Id. at 938. See also C.H. Guenther & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 983, 985 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced,
414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1967).
167. 696 F.2d at 938.
168. Id. at 939.
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statement 'for cause' only if statements by striking employees threaten
immediate physical harm or are accompanied by threatening physical acts
or gestures. Similarly, the Board holds that crudeness and obscenities,
which might be considered unprotected insubordination in a working con-
text, will not be considered sufficient cause to warrant the employer's re-
fusal to reinstate strikers.1 The court concluded that name calling in the
context of an economic strike may be deemed positively protected by the
"free speech" provisions of section 8(c) of the Act."'
The employer advocated a standard, adopted by some courts,171 that
reinstatement can be denied if the misconduct may reasonably tend to
coerce or intimidate other employees in the exercise of rights protected
by the Act. 7M The employer argued that if this objective standard was
applied to the statement "We'll take care of you," it would reasonably
tend to coerce the employee to whom it was directed and thus be "cause"
to justify the denial of reinstatement.173 The court refused to adopt this
standard of "cause" but rather accepted the Board's standard and af-
firmed the Board's conclusion that, as the employees' statements were not
accompanied by any threat of immediate harm or threatening physical
acts, reinstatement of the striking workers was required.174 In so holding,
the Eleventh Circuit distinguished a very similar predecessor Fifth Cir-
cuit opinion in which reinstatement was denied.1 76
The court, in Mead Corp. v. NLRB,17 also dealt with the issue of em-
ployer threats. The Board had found that a foreman told one employee
that "there had been others [who were 'hot dog organizers'] and that they
169. Id.
170. Id. at 939-40 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976)). The position of the Board on rein-
statement was outlined by the court at 696 F.2d at 938-39. The Board has stated, "[The
emotional tension of a strike almost inevitably gives rise to a certain amount of disorder and
... conduct on a picket line cannot be expected to approach the etiquette of the drawing
room." Republic Creosoting Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 267, 288 (1940). The limitation on the Board's
power to reinstate is in § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976), which prohibits orders of rein-
statement for employees terminated "for cause." See NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748
(1st Cir. 1954).
171. See Associated Grocers of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1st Cir.
1977); Local 542, International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850, 852-53
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826 (1964).
172. 696 F.2d at 939.
173. Id. at 934 n.2, 939.
174. Id. at 939.
175. NLRB v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978). In Moore, the
striker was held dischargeable for telling a nonstriker, "there's ways to keep you from
[working]." Id. at 845. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Moore on the grounds that the
Moore strike had been marked by pervasive violence on the persons and personal property
of nonstrikers. In the present case, the relatively fewer acts of violence were directed only at
company property and not at individuals. 696 F.2d at 939.
176. 697 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1983).
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HeinOnline  -- 35 Mercer L. Rev. 1268 1983-1984
LABOR LAW
were no longer with the Company.""' Another employee was told that
"you are going to have to stop filing these grievances because these people
can really make it hard for you. They can fix it so you cannot get any
credit."' 7' The court affirmed the credibility findings of the Board that
such statements were made and concluded, as had the Board, that they
were threats that constituted unlawful interference with the employees'
rights to engage in union activities.' 79
In the same case, -the court accepted Board findings, which had
credited testimony of workers, that supervisors asked one employee why
another employee had been elected to the union grievance committee.'"
The court affirmed the Board conclusion that such questioning consti-
tuted impermissible interrogation in violation of section 8(a)(1).18' The
court noted that an employer with legitimate reasons may question em-
ployees concerning union matters. s Finding, however, no legitimate rea-
son for the interrogation and noting that it occurred in the context of
other threats, the court deemed it permissible to infer that the question-
ing suggested coercion or interference with union activity."'s
Employer discrimination was an issue in one case during the survey
period. The court in NLRB v. Sherwin-Williams Co." addressed the is-
sue of whether the denial of disability benefits to disabled workers during
a work stoppage violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act." In resolving this
issue, the court was required to analyze and apply the shifting burdens of
proving improper motivation.' es The court noted that the Supreme Court
has held that when discrimination by employers is "inherently destruc-
tive" of important employee rights, it is not necessary to prove that the
discrimination was actually motivated by a desire to interfere with pro-
tected rights.'6 7 Even if the employer established that its actions were
177. Id. at 1023.
178. Id. at 1024.
179. Id. at 1025-26.
180. Id. at 1024-25.
181. Id. at 1025-26.
182. Id. at 1025. Accord Strucknes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
183. 697 F.2d at 1025-26.
184. 714 F.2d 1095 (11th Cir. 1983).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). This section provides, in part, that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment...
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
186. 714 F.2d at 1099-1101. The statute does not expressly utilize terms requiring the
proof of motivation, but the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "to encourage or
discourage" as requiring a motive element. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976); Radio Officers
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 44 (1954).
187. 714 F.2d at 1100. Section 8(a)(3) talks solely in terms of "membership in a labor
organization." Discriminatioi, however, that discourages participation in concerted activi-
ties, such as striking, falls-within the prohibitions of the section. NLRB v. Erie Resistor
19841 1269
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motivated by bona fide business considerations, a ruling for the charging
party is permitted.ss If, however, the employer's discrimination has a
"comparatively slight" effect on employee rights and the employer comes
forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications
for its action, the employer will, at that point, be entitled to a finding in
its favor.' ss By presenting legitimate business justifications, the inference
of improper motivation has been refuted. The Board is permitted to find
that the employer has violated section 8(a)(3) only, if there is proof that
the employer was actually motivated by antiunion animus.'"
In Sherwin-Williams, the employer and the union had previously nego-
tiated a disability benefit plan that established a formula for compensat-
ing employees who were disabled."19 The plan expressly provided that
benefits would be paid only for hours that an employee reasonably would
have been expected to work had the employee not been disabled. s It
provided further that no benefits would be paid during periods when the
employer's plant was shut down.1' 3 At the expiration of the collective
agreement, of which the disability plan was a part, the union called an
economic strike, and the plant ceased operations. Pursuant to the provi-
sions in the disability plan, and consistent with past practice, the em-
ployer ceased paying benefits to a disabled employee. The Board found
that this denial of disability benefits, in response to an economic work
Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
188. 714 F.2d at 1100. Even though motive is an element to be proved in } 8(a)(3) cases,
the Court in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) held that certain discrimina-
tion, in that case "super-seniority" to persons who did not strike, was so "inherently de-
structive" of employee rights that improper motivation can be inferred from the discrimina-
tion itself. Id. at 227-29.
189. 714 F.2d at 1099 (citing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967)).
190. 714 F.2d at 1099-1101. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), set
forth the method by which the issue of motivation is addressed. When the discrimination is
"inherently destructive" the Court will continue to follow the holding of NLRB v. Erie Re-
sistor, 373 U.S. 221 (1963) that the discrimination itself carries an inference of illegal moti-
vation. Id. at 33-34. The Court, however, recognized that some discrimination may have a
"comparatively slight" impact on employee rights. Id. at 34. The effect of these cases is to
create an inference of improper motivation that, if not refuted by the employer, will require
a finding for the General Counsel. Id. at 33. If the employer, however, presents "legitimate
and substantial business justifications for the conduct" the burden is shifted to the General
Counsel to establish actual improper motivation. Id. at 34. See Intercollegiate Press v.
NLRB, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974). Compare the ap-
proach taken by the Court under Title 7 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). If the challenged practice has an adverse impact on a class
protected by that statute, the employer's burden is to show the "business necessity" of the
challenged practice. Id. at 431.
191. 714 F.2d at 1097.
192. Id. at 1099-1100.
193. Id. at 1100.
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stoppage by employees, was a form of discrimination motivated to dis-
courage concerted activity, )i violation of section 8(a)(3). The Eleventh
Circuit refused to enforca the Board order.'"
First, the court generally defined the types of employr discrimination
that would be 'inherently destructive' and thus truncate0any further in-
quiry into actual motivation: "Generally, those courts' that have ad-
dressed the question have described 'inherently destructive' conduct, as
that 'with far reaching effects which would hinder future bargaining, or
conduct which discriminated solely upon the basis of participating in
strikes or union activity.' """
The court found no persuasive evidence that the denial of disability
benefits had such an inherently destructive effect. '" Benefits had been
denied in the past and collective bargaining continued without creating
any obvious obstacles to the future exercise of employee rights. Further-
more, the court found that the action of the company did not appear to
influence the decision to strike nor the strikers' determination to continue
their work stoppage.1 Thus, the court appeared to accept the proposi-
tion that the denial of the disability benefits upon the commencement of
a work stoppage was 'discrimination' that had an effect on the decision to
strike and the ability to engage in collective bargaining, but indicated
that such effect on employee rights must be categorized as 'comparatively
slight.' Applying controlling Supreme Court analysis,'" the court then in-
quired into the legitimacy of the employer's justification. The court be-
lieved that complianco$ith the clear language of the past collective
agreement and the pst 4 iceIf ceasing disability payments when the
plant was not operating was a 'legitimate' business concern. Thus, the
burden was shifted to the General Counsel to present actual proof of anti-
union motivation.200 The court examined the record for evidence of im-
proper motive, but found none. The rule applied to union and nonunion
worker, to striker and nonstriker. It was neutral in that it would be ap-
plied to any situation when the plant was not operating. It was not used
by the employer as a threat to attempt to stop the strike or bring it to an
early end.201 Thus, the court held that the General Counsel failed to carry
194. Id. at 1096-97.
195. Id. at 1097.
196. Id. at 1101 (quoting Vesvius Crucible Co. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 162, 169 (3rd Cir.
1981)).
197. 714 F.2d at 1101.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 190.
200. 714 F.2d at 1100.
201. Id. at 1101. See Vesuvius Crucible Co. v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1981); E.L.
Wiegand Div., Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 650 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1429 (1982), in which such threats were sufficient evidence to sustain the Board finding
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its burden of establishing improper motivation. The order of the Board,
therefore, could not be enforced."'
C. Collective Bargaining
Negotiation of the Agreement. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively
with representatives of his employees.20 8 Section 8(d) of the Act defines
bargaining to include "the execution of a written contract incorporating
any agreement reached. '""20 The court, in Georgia Kraft Co. v. NLRB,' 05
addressed the issue of whether an agreement had been reached, thus obli-
gating the employer to execute a written contract.2 " Although the union
had formally 'accepted' the employer's 'final offer' concerning seniority,
the company argued that a final agreement had not been reached because
the acceptance did not cover many other issues discussed by the
parties. 20
The employer first pointed out that it had indicated to the union that
it was planning to discipline a number of striking employees for miscon-
duct during the strike. Thus, the employer argued that the union's ac-
ceptance of the final offer concerning seniority failed to accede to the
company's demand for striker discipline. Second, the employer argued
that, as the union had previously rejected company proposals over eco-
nomic issues that were not restated by the company's 'final offer,' the
union acceptance did not resolve the bargaining issues that previously
arose between the parties.'"1
The court agreed with the Board's conclusion that the issue of striker
discipline was not a topic to be resolved prior to reaching a final agree-
ment. Resolution of economic issues was not made contingent upon agree-
ing to striker discipline, nor did the employer ever intend it to be a spe-
cific contractual provision. Thus, the fact that discipline of strikers was
neither discussed nor resolved did not prevent the parties from reaching
an agreement.'" The court also agreed with the Board that prior union
rejection of many of the employer's economic proposals did not result in a
revocation of those proposals. 10 The common-law rule of contracts that a
of improper motivation.
202. 714 F.2d at 1101.
203. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
204. Id. § 158(d) (1976).
205. 696 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1983).
206. Id. at 935.
207. Id. at 935-36.
208. Id. at 936-38.
209. Id. at 937.
210. Id.
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rejection of an offer by the offeree terminates the offeree's power of ac-
ceptance""1 is not appropriate in collective bargaining:
A contract offer is not automatically terminated by the other party's re-
jection or counterproposal, but may be accepted within a reasonable time
unless it was expressly withdrawn prior to acceptance, was expressly
made contingent upon some condition subsequent, or was made subject
to intervening circumstances which malk]e it unfair to hold the offeror to
his bargain. 1 '
Thus, the acceptance of the company's final offer was deemed to be
broad enough to be not only an acceptance on the seniority issue raised
by the final offer, but also an acceptance of the previously rejected offers
made by the company on other major issues. An agreement, therefore,
was formed by the union acceptance, and the employer was obligated to
execute a written memorandum of the agreement. 8
In Mead Corp. v. NLRB,' 1" the court considered the obligation of an
employer to engage in midterm bargaining over wages and whether the
withdrawal of a proposal by an employer constituted a refusal to bargain
in good faith.' 1 ' Section 8(d) expressly provides that parties to an agree-
ment need not "discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and
conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification
is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened
under the provisions of the contract."' " Although the basic agreement
concerning wages had been resolved by the parties, wages for certain
specified job categories had not. The parties, nonetheless, entered into
the basic agreement that contained existing wage rates. That basic agree-
ment contained a standard 'zipper' clause indicating that it was complete.
The -agreement, however, was conditioned upon the employer agreeing to
bargain over wage rates of certain specified employment classifications.
This collateral agreement specifically authorized midcontract bargaining
over wage rates of the categories specified in the agreement. 1
In considering the employer's withdrawal of a tentative proposal, the
court recognized that such a withdrawal does not itself establish an ab-
sence of good faith bargaining. Withdrawal without good cause, however,
is 'evidence' of bad faith, particularly if the other party has tentatively
211. RzsTATmazr (SacOND) or Co mrAcTs § 38; FA NswoaTn, CoNTrAcrs § 3.20
(1982).
212. 696 F.2d at 937-38 (quoting Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 659 F.2d 87, 89-90
(8th Cir. 1981)).
213. 696 F.2d at 938.
214. 697 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1983).
215. Id. at 1016.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
217. 697 F.2d at 1017-18.
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agreed to the proposal or it appears that acceptance is imminent. Thus,
the court sustained the Board's finding that the withdrawal of a proposal
that the union leadership indicated was probably acceptable, after the
union negotiator requested a delay until it could be presented to the
membership, was sufficient to sustain a finding of bad faith.1 In short,
'bait and switch' is probably not a 'good faith' bargaining technique.
As a remedy, the Board ordered the employer to reinstate its with-
drawn proposal.21' The employer argued that this order compelled an
agreement between the parties, 20 something forbidden by the express
language of section 8(d). 2  The court responded that such an order
neither compelled agreement nor inserted a provision into the collective
agreement, but instead served to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The
Board did not abuse its broad discretion in fixing remedies by ordering
the employer to give the union an opportunity to accept a withdrawn
proposal."2
In NLRB v. Katz," the Supreme Court held that an employer had
violated its obligation to bargain in good faith with the union when it
unilaterally altered mandatory subjects of bargaining without notice and
without reaching a bargaining impasse with the union.2"4 This doctrine
prohibiting unilateral change is applicable to situations in which working
conditions are found in an expired collective bargaining agreement. An
employer cannot institute unilateral changes simply because the collective
bargaining agreement has by its own terms expired. Before the prior prac-
tice can be altered, the employer is obligated to bargain with the union.2"
The extent of the employer's duty to bargain prior to instituting changes
was litigated in NLRB v. Sherwin-Williams Co.22 Upon the expiration of
a collective agreement and during an economic strike, the employer an-
nounced its intention to cease giving holiday pay to a disabled employee,
218. Id. at 1022.
219. Id. at 1016.
220. Id. at 1023.
221. "Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99 (1970) (board remedial power does not include the power to require that proposals be
included in the collective agreement).
222. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969). The court in Mead indicated that its remedial order is analogous
to the situation in which the Board orders a party to execute a contract that had previously
been agreed upon by the parties. 697 F.2d at 1023 n.2. See Georgia Kraft Co. v. NLRB, 696
F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1983).
223. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
224. Id. at 747.
225. NLRB v. SAC Construction Co., 603 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (5th Cir. 1979); Hinson v.
NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1970).
226. 714 F.2d 1095 (11th Cir. 1983).
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a benefit that the employer had provided under the expired contract.,
The Board found that the employer made the alteration without giving
prompt notice to the union or bargaining with the union over the pro-
posed change prior to its implementation. This failure, the Board found,
was a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the Act.2" The Eleventh Circuit re-
fused to enforce the order. The court found that it was not necessary that
the union and employer bargain to impasse, nor did the Act even require
actual bargaining over the issue. The court held that the employer satis-
fied its statutory duty by notifying the union prior to implementing the
change and doing so in a manner that allowed the union a meaningful
opportunity to offer counterproposals and counterarguments."'
The court found that the union's notification on the day- the change
was to be effective, although no holiday was immediately involved, was
adequate notice. The fact that the notice was couched in the absolute
terms of a decision already made did not make it inadequate since the
union still had the opportunity to raise the issue of holiday pay for dis-
abled workers during the numerous negotiating sessions. Its failure to do
so, the court held, kept the employer's action from being a violation of
the Act. The employer was thus allowed to change a past practice by
making a statement to the union that it was changing that practice. If the
union fails to challenge the proposed action, the employer need not give
further notice before it implements the change.'"
Enforcement of the Agreement. It is well established that an indi-
vidual employee can sue to enforce uniquely personal rights created by
the collective agreement.' 31 It is equally well established that such a suit
by an individual cannot be sustained against an employer unless and un-
til he establishes that the bargaining representative breached its duty of
fair representation in the enforcement of the individual's personal claim
under the contract.s'
227. Id. at 1097.
228. Id. at 1102. That section makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
refuse to bargain collectively with representatives of his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1976). The issue of whether the denial of disability benefits at the commencement of an
economic strike is unlawful discrimination is discussed, supra text accompanying notes 191-
204.
229. 714 F.2d at 1102-03. Accord NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th
Cir. 1976).
230. 714 F.2d at 1102-03.
231. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
232. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 62 (1981); Freeman v. O'Neal
Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
The duty of fair representation is an implicit statutory duty imposed on the unions.
Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). A unit member may recover dam-
ages, but not punitive damages, against the union that breaches that duty. Bowen v. United
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In Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co.,*" the court applied these two
principles. The court held that employees could not enforce an arbitra-
tion award upholding a grievance unless the employees first established
that the union representing them breached its duty of fair representation
in failing to enforce the arbitrator's award. 2" A number of employees
filed a grievance alleging that the employer had decreased hauling rates
paid to employees in violation of the collective agreement. The union
processed the grievance to arbitration. In a short, ambiguous order the
arbitrator sustained the grievance. The employer's interpretation of the
arbitrator's award was that it only applied prospectively. Consequently,
the employer began to pay, from the date of the award, the rates de-
manded by the union. The union believed that the award required pay-
ment of back wages from the date when the employer changed rates. The
employer agreed that the collective agreement itself required retroactivity
of the hauling rate for thirty days back from the date of the arbitration
award. The union and the employer eventually agreed that the employer
would pay the increased rate starting with the date the initial grievance
was filed. A number of employees objected to this resolution and brought
suit in federal district court to enforce the arbitrator's original award, ar-
guing that the award gave them full retroactive back pay. The plaintiffs
did not join the union as a party, but alleged that the failure of the union
to enforce the arbitrator's award and secure full retroactivity was a
breach of the union's duty of fair representation."' The trial court re-
States Postal Service, 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust,
442 U.S. 42 (1979). In determining the nature of the union's duty, the Supreme Court has
stated:
Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any
negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The
mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete sat-
isfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of rea-
sonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the
unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in
the exercise of its discretion.. . . Seniority rules governing promotions, transfers,
layoffs and similar matters may, in the first instance, revolve around length of
competent service. Variations acceptable in the discretion of bargaining represent-
atives, however, may well include differences based upon such matters as the unit
within which seniority is to be computed, the privileges to which it shall relate,
the nature of the work, the time at which it is done, the fitness, ability or age of
the employees, their family responsibilities, injuries received in course of service,
and time or labor devoted to related public service, whether civil or military, vol-
untary of involuntary.
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1953) (citations omitted).
233. 709 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1983).
234. Id. at 1376.
235. Id. at 1373.
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ferred the matter back to the arbitrator for clarification of his award.'3
The arbitrator responded by stating that his order was intended to re-
quire back pay to be granted by the employer from the date that the
employer had unilaterally deviated from its past practices; the award,
thus, presumed full retroactivity." 7 Based on this response from the arbi-
trator, the trial court ordered enforcement of the award, meaning the
grant of full retroactivity of back pay as prayed for in the employee's
complaint." s
The court of appeals reversed and remanded.2 The court agreed with
plaintiffs that the union was not an indispensable party to the litigation.
An action may be brought against the employer for back wage liability
under the collective agreement without joining the union.240 The court,
however, agreed with defendant that, regardless of the arbitrator's clarifi-
cation establishing the employer's liability for retroactive back pay, the
award could not be enforced by the employees without the court first
finding that the union breached its duty of fair representation in not
seeking full retroactive enforcement of the original award. The court re-
manded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the union
had breached its duty of fair representation. 4 1 This case graphically illus-
trated that regardless of the clarity of the employees' contract rights, the
employees may judicially enforce these rights only if the employees estab-
lish that the union's failure to protect their rights breached the union's
duty to fairly represent the employees.
In Hand v. International Chemical Workers Union,ua1 the Eleventh
Circuit considered the statute of limitations applicable to enforcement of
contract rights. In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in DelCostello v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,'4 the Eleventh Circuit revised
its approach to the statute of limitations applicable to the enforcement of
236. Id. at 1374. The Eleventh Circuit held in 1983 that when an arbitrator's award can
be interpreted in a variety of ways, the normal course of action for a district court is to refer
the matter to the original arbitrator for clarification. American Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees, Local Lodge No. 1803 v. Walker County Medical Center, Inc., 715 F.2d
1517, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983). Accord Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-367
v. Rohm & Haas, Tex., Inc., 677 F.2d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 1982); San Antonio Newspaper
Guild, Local No. 25 v. San Antonio Light Div., 481 F.2d 821, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1973).
237. 709 F.2d at 1373.
238. Id. at 1374.
239. Id. at 1376.
240. Id. at 1375. Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); United
Postal Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 73 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
241. 709 F.2d at 1376. For a discussion of the union's duty see infra text accompanying
notes 259-69.
242. 712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983).
243. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
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collective agreements and the related breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation. Following the general practice prior to DelCostello, the court had
applied the most appropriate state statute.'" A prior panel of the circuit
had recognized that the most appropriate state statute for challenging an
arbitrator's award was a specific ninety day limitation."" The court, how-
ever, had determined that the breach of the duty of fair representation
sounded in tort and, thus, was governed by the four year state statute of
limitation governing torts. Consequently, in a suit filed within four
months of an arbitration award, the court affirmed the trial court's dis-
missal of the employer on the contract. Dismissal of the claims against
the union, however, was reversed as such an action would be timely if
filed within the four year period allowed for tort actions.'"
The Court in DelCostello intervened, however, holding that a federal
standard should be applied to actions alleging breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement when the union has also allegedly breached its duty of
fair representation." 7 The Supreme Court reasoned that since the breach
of the duty of fair representation is also an unfair labor practice subject
to NLRB proceedings'" and since an inseparable relationship exists be-
tween the private enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement and
the union's breach of its duty of fair representation," the most appropri-
ate standard would be the time limitation imposed by the NLRA for the
filing of unfair labor practice charges 2s The time limitation for filing
charges under the NLRA is six months from the commission of the al-
leged unfair labor practice. "s'
On the basis of the Court's holding in DelCostello, the Eleventh Circuit
found that both the action filed against the union for breach of the duty
of fair representation and the action against the employer alleging breach
of contract were governed by the NLRA six month limitation period.
Since the action was filed by plaintiff within four months, it was error for
the trial court to dismiss the complaint against either defendant. The
court thus gave retroactive application to the decision in DelCostello es-
tablishing a six month statute of limitations.''
244. 712 F.2d at 1351. See United Postal Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
245. Hand v. International Chem. Workers Union, 681 F.2d 1308 (11th Cir. 1982), reu'd,
712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983).
246. Id.
247. 103 S. Ct. at 2291-94.
248. Strick Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. 210, 217 (1979); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 17 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
249. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
250. 103 S. Ct. at 2293-94.
251. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1976).
252. 712 F.2d at 1351. Rogers v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 720 F.2d 1247 (11th Cir. 1983),
and Benson v. General Motors Corp., 716 F.2d 862 (11th Cir. 1983) confirmed the retroac-
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D. Union Restraint and Coercion
The Duty of Fair Representation. In Higdon v. United Steel-
workers of America,"' the Eleventh Circuit provided some guidance in
defining the extent of the union's duty to fairly and impartially represent
unit members.'" This duty of fair representation is implied from the con-
cept of exclusivitys' and thus has no explicit statutory definition. Its
breach, however, is actionable in a suit by the injured unit member under
section 301 of the Act s" and also constitutes an unfair labor practice that
may be remedied through NLRB proceedings."'
The employee in Higdon was discharged, according to the employer, for
insubordination, but without just cause and in violation of the collective
agreement, according to plaintiff employee. The union processed the em-
ployee's grievance through two of the three stages of the grievance ma-
chinery available under the collective bargaining contract. The union re-
fused, however, to initiate the final step of binding arbitration. The
employee filed suit against the employer for breach of the collective
agreement-discharge without cause-and against the union for breach of
the duty of fair representation-failing to proceed to arbitration. The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, ruling
that no material issue of fact existed as to the union's breach of its duty
of fair representation.2 "s Plaintiff argued on appeal that the union had
breached its duty by failing to investigate an alleged argument that plain-
tiff had with a customer on the morning of his discharge. Although recog-
nizing that total failure of a union to investigate a member's grievance
can violate its duty,'" the court found that the employee was discharged
for insubordination, not for his fight with the customer, and thus the
merits of any dispute the employee might have had with the customer
tive application of DelCostello in the Eleventh Circuit. Accord Storck v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 712 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1983). The issue of whether the federal six month
period would be applied if 'only' the employer was sued, and not the union, was not
resolved.
253. 706 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1983).
254.' Id. at 1562-63. See generally supra note 240.
255. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
257. See supra note 255.
258. 706 F.2d at 1561-62. A finding that there was no breach of the union duty of fair
representation allows the court to summarily dispose of the breach of contract claim against
the employer.,In order to reach the claim that the employer breached its contract by dis-
charging the employee, the court must first find that the union breached its duty of fair
representation. Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 709 F.2d 1371, 1375 (11th Cir. 1983). See
supra text accompanying notes 238-47.
259. 706 F.2d at 1562. See Tenorio v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 1982); Turner v.
Air Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1972).
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were not material to his discharge. Second, plaintiff argued that the union
failed to notify him of, and thus precluded his participation in, the sec-
ond step in the grievance proceeding. The court found that plaintiff's as-
sertion was not supported by the record facts. The court further added
that even if the employee had not been given notice and an opportunity
to attend a segment of the grievance process, this would not necessarily
establish that the union had breached its duty."' Finally, the employee
alleged that the record supported an inference that the union acted negli-
gently in not proceeding further with his grievance, and this negligence
stated a possible claim for recovery. The court, reaffirming Harris v.
Schwerman Trucking Co.,"' held that negligence does not constitute a
breach of the duty of fair representation.'" In defining the union's duty,
the court stated:
A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a
union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is ar-
bitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith .... [W]e think a decision to be
nonarbitrary must be (1) based upon relevant, permissible union factors
which excludes the possibility of its being based upon motivation such as
personal animosity or political favoritism; (2) a rational result of the con-
sideration of those factors; and (3) inclusive of a fair and impartial con-
sideration of the interest of all employees.'"
The trial court had found no indication that the union's action was
arbitrary when the union had investigated appellant's grievance and
weighed all relevant and permissible factors before choosing not to pro-
ceed to the final step of arbitration. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the record supported the findings of the trial court dismissing the
complaint.'"
In two decisions, the Eleventh Circuit considered procedural issues sur-
rounding the duty of fair representation. The first was the appropriate
statute of limitations. As discussed earlier,'" the Supreme Court held in
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters'" that in suits
against the union for a breach of the duty of fair representation, the
260. 706 F.2d at 1562. See Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d
1335, 1341 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 981 (1976).
261. 668 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1982). See Boisseau & Carlson, Labor Law, 1982 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 34 MEncan L. REv. 1319, 1329-30 (1983).
262. 706 F.2d at 1562.
263. Id. at 1562-63 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) and Tedford v.
Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 (5th Cir. 1976)).
264. 706 F.2d at 1563.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 249-58.
266. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
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courts should not apply state statutes of limitations, but rather should
use the six month limitation found in the NLRA for filing unfair labor
practice charges .2 7 The Eleventh Circuit applied the holding retroac-
tively, reversing a trial court decision that a ninety day state statute gov-
erning challenges to arbitrator awards mandated dismissal of plaintiff's
claims against the employer and union.'
The second case, Rader v. United Transportation Union,261 dealt with
the obligation of a union member to exhaust internal union procedures as
a condition precedent to filing suit against the union for breach of its
duty of fair representation.27 0 The court applied the Supreme Court case
of Clayton v. International Union, United Automobile Workers'" in
which, addressing this issue, the Supreme Court stated:
[C]ourts have discretion to decide whether to require exhaustion of in-
ternal union procedures. In exercising this discretion, at least three fac-
tors should be relevant: first, whether union officials are so hostile to
the employee that he could not hope to obtain a fair hearing on his
claim; second, whether the internal union appeals procedures would be
inadequate either to reactivate the employee's grievance or to award him
the full relief he seeks under § 301; and third, whether exhaustion of
internal procedures would unreasonably delay the employee's opportu-
nity to obtain a judicial hearing on the merits of his claim. If any of these
factors are found to exist, the court may properly excuse the employee's
failure to exhaust. 7"
The Eleventh Circuit concluded without discussion that the trial court
had not abused the discretion allowed by Clayton to dismiss the fair rep-
resentation suit by a union member.73 Although the union had failed to
present a claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement to the
National Railway Adjustment Board,'7 ' the employee apparently
presented no reason for his failure to process his complaint concerning
the union's inaction before available union tribunals.' 75 This failure was
fatal to any fair representation suit against the union. 70
Union Discrimination Against and Coercion of Employees.
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act prohibits employers from discriminating "in
267. Id. at 2293-95.
268. Hand v. International Chem. Workers Union, 712 F.2d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir. 1983).
269. 718 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1983).
270. Id. at 1013.
271. 451 U.S. 679 (1981).
272. Id. at 689.
273. 718 F.2d at 1014.
274. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 153.
275. 718 F.2d at 1013-14.
276. Id. at 1014.
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regard to hire or tenure of employment.., to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.' 7 7 Section 8(b)(2) parallels sec.
tion 8(a)(3) and makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of section 8(a)(3).'1 The Supreme Court has held that
an employer and labor organization do not violate the Act when they
enter an agreement under which the union operates an exclusive hiring
hall and from which the employer will secure its employees.'' In so hold-
ing, the Court noted, however, that the union operated hiring hall must
not discriminate in its referrals on the basis of union membership. Dis-
crimination against nonunion members in making job referrals would vio-
late section 8(b)(2)."0
In International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1408 v. NLRB,"11
the Eleventh Circuit considered the application of that doctrine. The
longshoremen had a hiring hall arrangement with a multiemployer unit,
the Jacksonville Maritime Association. A union member, who worked reg-
ularly as a longshoreman and used the services of the hiring hall, had a
public argument at the hiring hall with the local union president. The
union's executive board recommended that the member publicly apolo-
gize to the president, stating that the member would not be dispatched to
any work from the hiring hall until he made that apology. The member
refused to apologize and, as a consequence, was not dispatched to availa-
ble work. The Board found that the union action had violated section8(b)(2) .282
The union made two attacks on the Board's conclusion. It first argued
that the hiring hall arrangement between the union and the employers
was not an 'exclusive' hiring hall because potential employees could apply
directly to the employer for work. Since the hiring hall was not exclusive,
the union argued that its refusal to refer the member through the hall did
not 'cause' the employer to discriminate against the member.' The court
appeared to agree that if the employee could secure work with similar
277. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
278. Id. § 158(b)(2) (1976). The section states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization ...to cause or at-
tempt to cause an employer to discriminate.. . in violation of subsection (a)(3) of
this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom member-
ship in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other
than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly re-
quired as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
279. Local 357, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
280. Id. at 674-77.
281. 705 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1983).
282. Id. at 1550-51.
283. Id. at 1551-52.
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ease by applying directly to the employer, as opposed to being referred
through the hiring hall, the union's refusal to dispatch the member might
not be an unfair labor practice. The court, however, accepted the Board's
finding that the agreement between the union and the employers was a de
facto exclusive hiring hall. Although it was legally possible for the em-
ployer to secure workers from sources other than union referral, in actual
practice outside hiring was rare. The union's refusal to dispatch employ-
ees thus had the practical effect of causing employers to discriminate
against members who were not referred for work.2'
The union next argued that the member's outburst against the union
president was 'unprotected' and thus should permit his discipline.286 The
court held that, regardless of whether such a statement directed to an
employer would have permitted the employer to discipline the worker
without violating section 6(a)(1), the Act was not designed to allow a
union to discipline members for misconduct and then to use that internal
union misconduct to interfere with the errant member's employment.2
The court stated: "The keystone of an unfair labor practice in a situa-
tion involving a hiring hall and union discipline rests on the principle
that the union can not use the employer as a surrogate in enforcing its
internal affairs."'' 2 Whether an applicant or an employee is a good union
member is irrelevant to the issue of whether the employee should be
hired or retained by an employer.
Internal union discipline was also an issue in NLRB v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 323 ,2" but this dis-
cipline, the Board found, improperly restrained or coerced the employer
in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining and the adjustment of grievances. 28' The employee involved, a
certified master electrician, was a longtime member of the Electrical
Workers Union. He was working, however, as the electrical superinten-
dent for a company engaged in general housing development and con-
struction. The employee's responsibilities included supervising all electri-
cal contracts, hiring and firing electricians, resolving employee
complaints, and assigning work. He was paid a salary and had no owner-
284. Id. at 1552.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1552-53.
287. Id. at 1552. Accord International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union No.
8 v. NLRB, 665 F.2d 376, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1981); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's &
Warehousemen's Union, Local 27, 514 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1975).
288. 703 F.2d 501 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 366 (1983).
289. Id. at 503. The Act provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor or-
ganization,. . (1) to restrain or coerce ... (B) an employer in the selection of his repre-
sentatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976).
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ship in the company. The company was nonunion and had no collective
bargaining relationships. 290 The employee was charged by a union tribu-
nal with being a member who ran a nonunion business, a violation of
union rules. He was found guilty, fined more than $7,000, and eventually
expelled from the union.21 The NLRB found that disciplining a member
because he worked as a supervisor for a nonunion firm violated the Act.'"
Violations of section 8(b)(1)(B) occur not only when the union places
direct pressure on the employer in the selection of supervisors, but also
when pressure aimed at supervisors indirectly affects the employer's se-
lection of its supervisors.2 ' Punitive measures taken by the union against
supervisory personnel will not violate the Act when the discipline is di-
rected against members for undertaking duties customarily performed by
rank and file workers.'9 If, however, supervisors are disciplined for per-
forming their supervisory duties-duties involving collective bargaining
and grievance adjustments--such discipline will violate section
8(b)(1)(B). 2es Such pressure improperly affects the supervisors' will or
ability to fulfill their supervisory duties, and this indirectly tends to co-
erce the employer to select supervisors other than the ones being pres-
sured by the union.'"
The union appeared to accept these basic premises, but argued, with
support from the Ninth Circuit,"' that this analysis should be applied
only when the union has or is seeking a collective relationship with the
disciplined employee's employer. The union argued that the indirect pres-
sure on the employer flowing from discipline of a supervisor does not ex-
ist if the employer has no relationship with the union."'6 Declining to fol-
290. 703 F.2d at 502.
291. Id. at 02-03.
292. Id. at 503. Although there was some evidence that the union requested the em-
ployee to quit his job, no evidence existed that the union attempted to pressure the em-
ployer to discharge or reassign the employee. Such an attempt to interfere with the em-
ployee's employment, because of his failure to comply with union rules, would be a clear
violation of § 8(b)(2) of the Act. International Longshoremen's Asa'n, Local 1408 v. NLRB,
705 F.2d 1549, 1552-53 (11th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 277-87 and accompanying text.
293. 703 F.2d at 503. See American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc., 437 U.S. 411, 429-30 (1978); San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18, 172
N.L.R.B. 2173, 2174 (1968).
294. 703 F.2d 'at 504. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 813 (1974).
295. 703 F.2d at 504. See American Broadcasting Cos. v. Writers Guild of America,
West, Inc., 437 U.S. 411,,430 (1978); New Mexico Dist Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B.
500, 503 (1969), enforced, 454 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1972).
296. 703 F.2d at 504.
297. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 73, 621 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.),
modified, 714 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1980).
298. 703 F.2d at 505-07.
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low this limited application of section 8(b)(1)(B), the Eleventh Circuit
found that union discipline of a supervisor could have the effect of inter-
fering or influencing even a nonunion employer's choice of a
representative 2
m
The union also pointed out that union discipline of an 'employer' has
been held not to violate section 8(b)(1)(B) because the discipline of the
employer himself could have no effect on the selection of a representa-
tive.3" The union argued that the employee being disciplined was not re-
ally a supervisor, but indeed was an 'employer.' The court rejected this
argument and concluded that the union had confused ownership with
managerial responsibilities. Supervisors necessarily undertake many roles
associated with an employer. Absent any ownership, financial, or proprie-
tary interest in the employer, however, a supervisor should not be con-
strued as an 'employer' for the purpose of section 8(b)(1)(B). 30
Secondary Boycotts. In Lane Crane Services, -Inc. v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 177,802 a nonunion elec-
trical contractor, Manning, had a labor dispute with defendant electrical
workers' union. The union picketed a construction site upon which Man-
ning, the prime contractor, was engaged in construction. After the picket-
ing began, Manning provided a separate gate at the site for employees of
subcontractors, particularly the employees of Lane Crane Services, who
were hired to install poles for the lighting. Electrical workers continued
picketing the separate, subcontractors' gate with signs that indicated the
union objected to Manning's substandard wages. Both Manning and
Lane, the subcontractor, sued the union for damages under section 303 of
the Act.3' Plaintiffs alleged that defendant union, by picketing the sepa-
rate gate, committed a secondary boycott in violation of section
8(b)(4)(B).30 The jury returned a verdict against the union for more than
$35,000. The union appealed the judgment rendered on the verdict.08"
If a union pickets a subcontractor with which it has no dispute, such
picketing is a proscribed secondary boycott when an object of the picket-
ing is to coerce the subcontractor to cease doing business with the general
contractor with which the union does have a labor dispute.8 " Courts will
deem the picketing to be coercion of the neutral subcontractor for the
299. Id. at 506-07.
300. Id. at 507. See Glaziers & Glassworkers, Local 1621, 221 N.L.R.B. 509, 513 (1975).
301. 703 F.2d at 507.
302. 704 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1983).
303. Id. at 552-53. The Act allows recovery of damages for persons injured by actions in
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976).
304. 704 F.2d at 553. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
305. 704 F.2d at 553.
306. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const.. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 685-87 (1951);
NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 400 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1971).
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proscribed object if the union pickets the gates established by the general
contractor for the exclusive use of the neutral subcontractor.3se It is clear,
however, that if the object of the union's picketing is not to force an al-
teration of the business relationship of the two employers, but to inform
the public of some practice of the employers, such 'information' picketing
is not for an object proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(B) and thus does not
violate the Act.s0s
In Lane Crane Services, the court adjudicated these principles. The
union argued that the prime contractor, with whom it had the primary
dispute, did not clearly set up separate gates, but had signs directing all
employees to the opposite gate. Thus, the picketing at the -so called sepa-
rate gate was, in reality, primary picketing of the premises of the primary
situs.3" The court rejected this argument. Although it recognized that the
initial confusion in the wording of the signs might have permitted picket-
ing of all gates at first, the court noted that the confusion was corrected
by the employers. Therefore' picketing at the reserved gate after the di-
rections were clarified fell within the basic prohibition of picketing re-
served gates of neutral subcontractors.310 The union argued that the evi-
dence did not support a finding that its motive for picketing all gates was
to force cessation of business. The court disagreed and held that the key
issue was the union's motive in picketing, and 'an object' of that picketing
must be to force the ceasing of business. Significant evidence indicated
that the union intended employees of the secondary, neutral employer to
honor the picket line and in this way secure concessions from the primary
employer. This evidence included testimony of an official of the union
representing the neutral employer, who stated that he was told by the
picketing union that the picketing was sanctioned and was working.311
The final argument of the union was that no evidence existed to sup-
port a finding that the picketing was that of the 'labor organization.'312
The statute establishes liability only for the union pressure, not for ac-
tions by individuals.318 The court determined that the 'ordinary rules of
307. Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79, 83 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 914 (1968). See generally Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S.
667 (1961).
308. 704 F.2d at 553. See Texas Distribs., Inc. v. Local Union No. 100, 598 F.2d 393, 398
(5th Cir. 1979); National Woodwork Mfrs. As'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 632 (1967).
309. 704 F.2d at 552-53. The necessity that separate gates be established and clearly
marked by a primary disputant to isolate the dispute to gates reserved to its own employees
was established in Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 680-81
(1961).
310. 704 F.2d at 553-54.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 554.
313. 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976).
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agency' determine union responsibility for the picketing14 and concluded
that, although not expressly authorized by the union, the picketing could
be attributed to the union. The picketing was done and directed by of-
ficers of the union, and the picket signs were purchased with union funds.
This was sufficient to make the union liable for the secondary pressure."z
IV. RAILWAY LABOR ACT
The only significant case to arise under the Railway Labor Act
(RLA)1'1 was Rader v. United Transportation Union."17 The employee
sought to sue the employer for breach of contract and the union for
breach of the duty of fair representation.31' The trial court dismissed
both claims. The court of appeals affirmed."1' The issue of whether the
contract had been breached had not been submitted to the National Rail-
way Adjustment Board for resolution as required by the RLA. u0 Follow-
ing the Supreme Court decision of Walker v. Southern Railway Co.,"I
the court concluded that interpretation of collective bargaining agree-
ments, particularly as they relate to a discharge grievance, are 'minor dis-
putes' subject to the mandatory resolution procedures under the RLA,
namely submission to the Adjustment Board.322 The court held that it
had no jurisdiction to resolve the disputes until the procedures have been
completed, 32 Plaintiff employee argued that the union failed to submit
the dispute to the Adjustment Board and that this failure allowed plain-
tiff to proceed without prior submission.$"
Relying on another Supreme Court decision, Andrews v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad,2 the court rejected this argument. Since under the
RLA, unlike the NLRA,"s the employee is free to process his own con-
314. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1966).
315. 704 F.2d at 554.
316. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
317. 718 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1983).
318. Id. The duty of fair representation is an implicit duty imposed by virtue of the
exclusive power of representation granted under both the RLA and the NLRA. Breach of
that duty can be remedied by suit under § 301 of the NLRA. See supra text accompanying
notes 238-64.
319. 718 F.2d at 1014.
320. Id. at 1012-14.
321. 385 U.S. 196 (1966). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & 1.
R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 39 (1957).
322. 718 F.2d at 1013.
323. Id. at 1014.
324. Id.
325. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
326. See Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 709 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1983), discussed
supra at notes 241-47.
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tractual grievance, the employee's failure to exhaust this remedy is fatal
to any claim in court."ss The employee cited Glover v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Railway'26 as making an exception to the rule. The court, how-
ever, pointed out that the Supreme Court in Glover addressed not a sim-
ple failure of the union to process the grievance, but systematic racial
discrimination against the employees by both the union and the rail-
road.' 2 ' It was this widespread racially motivated conspiracy to deprive
the employees of their rights that permitted suit without exhaustion of
the RLA remedies. Such a conspiracy was not evident in this case. Thus,
the suit against the employer was dismissed. The suit against the union
for breach of its fair representation duty was barred by the failure of the
employee union member to exhaust available intraunion remedies to re-
solve the dispute.3s 0
V. MIGRANT FARM LABoR
In two significant cases, the Eleventh Circuit considered the rights of
farm laborers and the duty of farm employers. One case, Frank Diehl
Farms v. Secretary of Labor,"' arose under OSHA;"' the other case, Ri-
vera v. Adams Packing Association,,"' arose under the recordkeeping re-
quirements of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act."
OSHA grants to the Secretary of Labor broad powers to promulgate
and enforce safety and health standards at the "workplace.""' Pursuant
to his statutory authority to use consensus standards of professional orga-
nizations to govern the level of health and safety precautions employers
must provide,' 6 the Secretary adopted a regulation setting industry stan-
327. 718 F.2d at 1014.
328. 393 U.S. 324 (1969). The court also recognized that, because the Andrews case came
three years after the Glover decision, any implications from Glover that union unfairness
obviated the requirement that the individual present his dispute to the National Railway
Adjustment Board prior to suit had been undercut. In short, the Eleventh Circuit suggested
that Glover be limited to its facts. 718 F.2d at 1014.
329. 718 F.2d at 1014.
330. Id. The court followed Clayton v. United Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 689
(1981). For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see supra notes 279-80 and accompanying
text.
331. 696 F.2d 1325 (11th Cir. 1983).
332. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
333. 707 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1983).
334. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2053 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This Act was amended as of January,
1983 and is now codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1856 (West Supp. 1983). The court was
addressing the provisions as found prior to 1983.
335. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a). See also 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) and (b).
336. Id. § 655(a) (1976).
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dards for temporary labor camps.337 In Frank Diehl Farms, the Secre-
tary's power to enact that regulation was not at issue. The issue that was
presented to the Eleventh Circuit was the power of the Secretary to en-
force that standard against farm employers who provide optional housing
to temporary employees.'" Initially, the standard was made applicable to
employee housing only if employees were required to reside in the hous-
ing as a "condition of employment."' In 1979, the Secretary revised the
enforcement directives and sought to enforce the housing standards
against employer-provided housing that was "directly related'to employ-
ment."" Pursuant to this expanded interpretation, the Secretary
brought a proceeding before the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission against farms that provided employee substandard housing.
The Commission agreed that the regulation could be enforced against
these farm employers and that the housing provided to employees failed
to meet the minimum health and safety standards of the regulation. The
farmers did not contest the finding that their housing failed to meet regu-
latory standards, but they did petition for review of the Commission
holding that the Secretary could regulate their optional housing. The Sec-
retary maintained he possessed the authority to apply OSHA health and
safety standards to housing even if laborers were not compelled to live
there. The touchstone was whether the employer-provided housing was
"directly beneficial, convenient, or advantageous to the employer."' The
employers, on the other hand, asserted that OSHA standards for housing
could only be applied when employees are required to live in employer
housing as a condition of employment. In short, the issue that divided the
parties was whether the Act could be construed to apply to housing that
is 'work related' and beneficial to the employer, but that is not a neces-
sary condition of employment."3 The issue that divided the parties also
divided the court. In a split decision, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
Commission finding that had upheld the position of the Secretary."8
The court first concluded that the express statutory terms limit the au-
thority of the Secretary to regulate health and safety in the 'workplace' to
insuring safe and healthy 'work situations' and 'working conditions.'"'
Authority to extend regulation power beyond where work is performed to
337. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142 (1982).
338. 696 F.2d at 1327.
339. Id. at 1328.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1329 (quoting Secretary of Labor v. C.R. Burnett & Sons, Inc., 9 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1009, 1018 (1980)).
342. 696 F.2d at 1329.
343. Id. at 1333.
344. Id. at 1331-32. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 955(a), 651(a) and (b).
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places of residence, where no work is performed, cannot be found in the
statute itself. Regulatory authority, the court held, could not be extended
to housing unless there was a close connection between the housing and
the job. The court was willing to accept that such a connection would
exist when employees were required as an express condition of employ-
ment to reside in employer-provided housing. The court also accepted the
idea that work place safety regulations could be enforced if, as a practical
matter, due to lack of housing alternatives in the area, employees had no
realistic choice but to live in housing provided by the employer. The
court, however, was unwilling to conclude that simply because furnishing
housing was convenient for the employer, it thus would make the housing
part of the 'workplace' subject to OSHA regulations.8 '5
To support its interpretation of the Act, the court drew heavily from
prevailing interpretations of workers' compensation statutes.$' Under
prevailing law, if the employees must accept the housing or if no practical
alternative exists but to accept the employer's housing, then employees
generally are entitled to compensation for injuries incurred in the resi-
dence, even if the injury took place during a nonwork period. If, however,
the employee is free to seek alternative housing, injuries occurring in the
employer-provided house during nonworking hours are not generally cov-
ered by workers' compensation schemes."7
The court refused to give the usual deference to administrative inter-
pretations of statutes,"" primarily because the agency had not consist-
ently followed the interpretation it now was urging. 8 " Deviations from
longstanding interpretations will be given substantial deference by the
courts only if a "detailed and comprehensive process" has prompted the
change.8' As no such process preceded the Secretary's new position, his
current interpretation was not entitled to substantial deference. The
court also noted that the regulation was not legislative, but interpretative.
The interpretation did not involve technical matters outside the expertise
of the courts, but rather, involved a legal interpretation of a statutory
term, 'workplace.' Legal definition is an area in which administrative ex-
345. 696 F.2d at 1333.
346. Id. at 1332.
347. See 1 A. LAatsoN, LaRSoN's WORKMEN'S COMPENSATMON, § 24.40 (Desk Ed. 1983).
348. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1980); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
349. 696 F.2d at 1330. The court relied on General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143
(1976), to support this reduced level of deference.
350. 696 F.2d at 1330. The standard of "detailed and comprehensive process" that allow
modifications to be given the same deference as original, contemporary constructions was
extrapolated from Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979), in which the court gave
deference to recently amended official interpretations.
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pertise is entitled to the least judicial deference. s 's
The employers in this case provided housing for seasonal workers at
little or no cost to the employees. The workers were not required as a
condition of employment to reside in the housing. Alternative housing
was available in the area and, in fact, many employees exercised their
option to reside in dwellings other than those provided by the employ-
ers.'6 No doubt the housing was beneficial to the employer, for without
it, housing in the area would have been insufficient to accommodate sea-
sonal, temporary workers. Because, however, the Secretary's power to reg-
ulate health and safety of employee housing was limited to when "com-
pany policy or practical necessity forces workers to live in employer
provided housing," 8" the Commission's finding of employer liability was
reversed. 8"
Under the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, a person who em-
ploys migrant farm labor must keep payroll records and obtain from farm
labor contractors other information and records required under the
Act." O In Rivera, seven migrant farm laborers brought suit against 'a
farmer for failure to secure and maintain the records required by the stat-
ute.3" Defendant farmer's primary defense was that any errors or inaccu-
racies in the records were due to the failure of the farm labor contractor
to provide accurate records to defendant farmer, and that the farm 'user'
could not be liable for the contractor's failure to keep and supply accu-
rate records." 7
The trial court held that the employer-'user' of farm labor had an af-
firmative duty to obtain and maintain accurate records, not merely to
maintain whatever forms or information the labor contractor might sup-
ply."' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed." The court held that although the
employer had no duty to conduct an audit or make an extensive investi-
gation to determine if the records supplied to it by a contractor were ac-
351. 696 F.2d at 1330. See Oifield Safety & Mach. Splecialties, Inc. v. Harman Unlim-
ited, Inc., 625 F.2d 1248, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980); Brennan v. General Tel. Co., 488 F.2d 157,
160 (5th Cir. 1973).
352. 696 F.2d at 1327.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. 7 U.S.C. § 2050(c) (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821, 1831 (West Supp.
1983)). Private suit is available to any person aggrieved by a violation of the statute. 7
U.S.C. § 2050a(a) (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1854(a) (West Supp. 1983)). Civil
penalties are provided for intentionally violating the Act. 7 U.S.C. § 2050a(b) (1976) (cur-
rent version at 29 U.S.C.A. I 1854(c)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1983)).
356. 707 F.2d at 1280.
357. Id. at 1281.
358. Id. at 1280.
359. Id.
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curate, the Act requires more than passive acceptance of information pro-
vided by the contractor.' Thus, employer liability can be established if
the farmer accepts from the contractor required records that: (1) are pa-
tently or obviously incomplete in that: they do not contain the informa-
tion required to be kept under the statute and implementing regula-
tions," ' or (2) contain palpably erroneous information in light of well-
known practices of farm labor business or when the user's own records
clearly indicate the contractor's information arguably could not be cor-
rect." 2 On the other hand, if the records supplied by the contractor ap-
pear complete and legitimate so that extrinsic evidence not within the
possession of the user would be necessary to show their incompleteness or
inaccuracy, then the user has not failed to comply with the recordkeeping
provisions of the Act simply because the information provided by the
contractor was incomplete or erroneous." 8
There were six alleged deficiencies in the user's records, most of which
were supplied by the farm labor contractors: (1) omissions of hours
worked by individual workers, (2) omission of addresses of employees, (3)
failure to list all members of work crews, (4) inaccurate listing of earn-
ings, (5) underreporting of total hours worked, and (6) failure to list rent
reductions from payroll records.$" The first two deficiencies addressed
data that the regulations required to be kept."' The user could determine
from the face of the records that required data had not been supplied by
the contractor. Because of these omissions, the user was liable." The
court held that the next three were deficiencies so palpable in light of
industry practices that the user should have been put on notice that the
contractor was violating the recordkeeping requirements. For example,
the records disclose that one employee earned an average of $37.60 per
hour, when the average worker would receive no more than $5.00 per
hour. For these palpable errors that should have provoked inquiry, the
user also was held liable." 7 The court concluded that the final deficiency,
failure to list rent deductions, was not palpable.$" Rent deductions are
not necessarily made from all employees. The fact, therefore, that they
were sporadically noted in the records would not have indicated that re-
cording errors had been made by the contractor."'
360. Id. at 1281.
361. Id. at 1282.
362. Id. at 1283.
363. Id. at 1281.
364. Id. at 1282.
365. 29 C.F.R. § 40.51(k) (1982).
366. 707 F.2d at 1282.
367. Id. at 1282-83.
368. Id. at 1283.
369. Id.
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The statute provides a remedy of up to $500 per plaintiff, per violation
for intentional violations.3" The trial court imposed this remedy. The
users contended on appeal that the violation was not "intentional." The
appeals court rejected this argument." ' An act is "intentional" within the
meaning of this Act, the court held, when the person is aware of the exis-
tence of the statute, and the person knowingly acts in a way that violates
the statute."7' Good faith belief in the absence of liability does not pre-
vent the action from being 'intentional.' 73
VI. FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
In Florida National Guard v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,"
the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Civil Service Reform Act, which re-
quires that employees of the federal government representing unions in
negotiations of collective agreements with federal employers be given 'of-
ficial time' for attending contract proceedings.3s" The Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority, which administers federal labor relations and collective
bargaining, interpreted this provision of the Act as requiring the agency
to not only release the employee with pay, but to pay per diem travel
allowances and expenses for such travel .37 The Eleventh Circuit held
that the Federal Labor Relations Authority had misinterpreted the stat-
ute. 87 It concluded that no such payment of travel from agency funds
could be required.1s7 Late in 1983, the Supreme Court confirmed this
holding.' 7 '
370. 7 U.S.C. I 2050a(b) (1976) (current version at 29 U.S.C.A. I 1854(c)(1) (West Supp.
1983)).
371. 707 F.2d at 1283.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 1283. Accord DeLeon v. Ramirez, 465 F. Supp. 698, 705 (S.D.N.Y 1979). See
also Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), under which a
similar interpretation of 'intentional' has been given. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457
F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972).
374. 699 F.2d 1082 (lth Cir. 1983).
375. Section 7131(a) provides:
Any employee representing an exclusive representative in the negotiation of a col-
lective bargaining agreement under this chapter shall be authorized official time
for such purposes, including attendance at impasse proceeding, during the time
the employee otherwise would be in a duty status. The number of employees for
whom official time is authorized under this subsection shall not exceed the num-
ber of individuals designated as representing the agency for such purposes.
5 U.S.C. § 7131(a) (Supp. V 1981).
376. 699 F.2d at 1083.
377. Id. at 1087.
378. Id. at 1087-88.
379. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 104
S. Ct. 439 (1983).
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